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Abstract
The paper examines three military interventions in Sub-Saharan 
Africa which took place in the mid and late 1990s in Rwanda, the 
DRC and Lesotho. These interventions took place despite high 
expectations o f international and regional peace on the part of 
most analysts after the collapse o f  cold war in 1989. However, 
interstate and intrastate conflicts re-emerged with more intensity 
than ever before, and sub-Saharan Africa proved to be no 
exception. The study sets out to analyse the constitutionality of 
these military interventions in Rwanda in 1990, the DRC in 1996- 
7, and the Lesotho intervention in 1998. In examining these 
interventions, the study investigates the role o f  national 
parliaments o f  these countries in facilitating these interventions. It 
also assesses the efforts o f  the national parliaments o f  intervening 
countries in holding their political executive accountable and 
evaluates the constitutionality of these interventions.
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Introduction
Military interventions played a crucial role in Rwandan, DRC and 
Lesotho intra-state conflicts in 1994, 1996-1997 and 1998. Realists 
like Morgenthau (1967), and Kenneth Waltz (1979) argue that, 
states which subscribe to realism, abide by international law only 
when it is not inconsistent with their quest for power and national 
security interests. If these laws are seen to be in conflict with their 
power interests, they violate them. This violation is also extended 
to their internal constitutions when they are regarded as being 
limiting or threatening to the augmentation and preservation of 
their power interests. This paper analyses the extent to which the 
intervening countries subscribed to or violated their own 
constitutions before and during their interventions in Rwanda, the 
DRC and Lesotho intrastate conflicts.
The constitutionality of the interventions and the effectiveness 
of the parliaments of intervening states in facilitating them will 
also be evaluated. This is crucial because the military, as the 
coercive institution of the state, cannot be left to generals and 
presidents alone. The former French Prime Minister, Georges 
Clemenceau, put this point succinctly: “War is a much too serious 
matter to be trusted to the military” (Tshitereke 2004: 72). on their 
own. This statement presupposes that, while other state institutions 
are equally important, the security o f the state is even more critical 
and, like other state institutions, it should not escape public 
scrutiny. Therefore, the;
“defence and security is such a vital area o f  public 
policy both in terms o f  its subject matter (war) and 
in terms o f  the proportion o f  public expenditure that 
it cannot and should not be left to the Executive 
alone. It is also a vital area o f  concern in terms o f  
regulating civil-military relations and in finding a 
balance between the military security o f  the 
territory/state and the socio-economic security o f  
the citizens. The challenge to Parliament is how to 
balance this equation not only as the elected watch
dog over public policy but also as the ultimate
authority over the public purse" (Mwesiga
2004:36).
It is imperative that the civilian leadership, and most importantly 
parliament, must be closely involved in security matters. The 
parliamentary oversight and scrutiny of the military is, therefore, 
critical in any state. It is also important to note that Uganda during 
its 1990 intervention in Rwanda did not have a constitution in 
place, while the Burundian and Rwandan constitutions were also in 
suspension or going through a process of redrafting, pending 
adoption by referendum.
The concept o f constitutionalism limits the arbitrariness of 
political power. While the concept recognises the necessity of 
government, it also insists upon limitations placed upon its powers. 
In essence, constitutionalism is an antithesis of arbitrary rule. Its 
opposite is dictatorial government, the government of will instead 
of law or rather undemocratic government, which is not 
accountable to its constituents. Constitution, therefore, is “a formal 
document having the force o f law, by which a society organises a 
government for itself, defines and limits its powers, and prescribes 
the relations of its various organs inter se, and with the citizens” 
(Nwabuezel973: 2). Conversely, the Constitution can also be used 
for other purposes rather than as a restraint to governmental 
powers. It is also in this perspective that the paper will evaluate the 
constitutionality o f these interventions.
The Constitution as a Rule-Binding Instrument
For parliaments to function effectively and efficiently, they must 
operate within a constitutional framework because “constitutions 
are especially important in determining the territorial distribution 
o f powers within the state”(Hague, et al, 1993:261). Similarly, John 
Locke argues that, “The first and fundamental positive law of all 
Commonwealth is the establishing of the legislative power; as the 
first and fundamental natural law, which is to govern even the
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legislative itself, is the preservation of the society, and of every 
person in it” (Lockel991: 355-6). The importance of constitutions 
in this regard cannot be overemphasised because even 
“authoritarian and repressive regimes rarely dispense with 
constitutional appearances completely; constitutions are part of this 
tribute that vice plays to virtue” (Locke 1991: 262). This is because 
constitutions set the rules and powers of the governors and the 
rules of the political game (Watsonl989:pp.51-64, Lijphartl984).
David Beetham opines that, for power to be legitimate, it 
should not only be based on the three Weberian principles of 
traditional, legal rational and charismatic authority, but “it must 
conform to established rules”(Beetham 1991:16, Schwarzmantel 
1994:16). Therefore, constitution forms the crucial aspect, in this 
case as a rule-binding instrument. This implies that all the 
intervening countries were rule bound to subscribe to their 
constitutions, whether they liked it or not. In exercising their 
power, states have to respect constitutional rules and, therefore, not 
act in an arbitrary manner.
Holmes argues that constitution, as a higher law, “is a device 
for limiting the power of government.. .it disempowers short­
sighted majorities in the name of binding norms”(Holmes 
1995:135). Hague sees it as a “state code in which the powers of, 
and relationships between, institutions are specified in considerable 
detail”(Hague et al 1993:262). Most of the intervening countries 
had constitutions, which regulate the behaviour between public 
authorities and their citizens(Plotke2000:l-7).
The Role of Legislatures
Legislatures are the most important organ of the state. Locke 
contends that “the legislative power is that which has a right to 
direct how the force of the Commonwealth shall be implored for 
preserving the community and the members of it” (Locke 1991: 
364). The legislature is the law making body where government 
policies are discussed and assessed (Read 1993). The political 
history of legislatures inform us that “the roots of the name of the
first modem legislature, the British Parliament, suggest this crucial 
function, the French word 'parlez' means ‘to talk’”(Danzinger 
1998: 132). Apart from discussing and assessing policies, 
legislatures enact legislation, oversee the national/political 
Executive, and represent the citizenry. Therefore, “the roots of the 
word legislature itself are the Latin words legis, meaning ‘law’, 
and latio, ‘bringing or proposing” ’ (Danzinger 1998: 132). In 
contemporary society this role has been taken over by the 
Executive in most political systems. However, this does not mean 
that the central role of enacting legislation has been removed from 
this body. Legislatures still make laws in most political systems. In 
many o f these polities, laws are similarly initiated and drafted by 
this body.
The legislature is a representative body o f the citizenry (Birch 
1993, Hague 1993,:292,Lijphard2000). The concept of 
representation is not a straightforward one, since it has four 
conceptual meanings o f interests that a parliamentarian must strive 
to represent, namely:
a) the group that forms his constituency, which may be a 
social class or religious group;
b) the country as a whole, “whose broad interests might 
transcend those o f any group or party; or the legislator’s 
own conscience which provides moral and intellectual 
judgement about appropriate political behaviour” 
(Danzinger 1998:133, Hague et al, 1993:292).
c) the political party to which a parliamentarian owes loyalty; 
and
d) the most important function of a legislator is to represent 
the interests o f the governed.
In most states, it is possible for a legislator to represent these four 
conceptions without a deeper conflict in dealing with the problem 
of representation. However, in some cases legislatures seemed to 
lack choices, mostly in undemocratic states and democratic one- 
party dominant states, like Uganda, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The 
common characteristics o f these states are their diminished
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independence of the legislators’ role. The legislators under these 
conditions, “where their actions are dictated by the political 
leadership, act as little more than ‘rubber stamps’. This position 
would probably characterise the behaviour o f a legislator in Cuba 
or Zimbabwe”(Danzinger 1998:133).
The role of legislators in the countries that were involved in 
intrastate conflicts in Rwanda, the DRC and Lesotho were 
characteristic of the above description. In democratic states like 
South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Botswana, legislators are 
required to follow the party line. They have to conduct themselves 
in this manner or else they risk being de-selected come the next 
election. The legislator who desires to survive politically is 
confronted with this difficult choice. This constraint has 
incapacitated the oversight role of legislatures where the Executive 
is too strong and dominates the whole parliament (Thandi 2004).
Oversight of the Executive
The other important function of the legislator is to oversee the 
actions of the political Executive. While political systems vary in 
different respects, in some cases, legislators may exert 
considerable influence on the actions of the Executive. This may 
be in relation to Executive actions, confirming members of the 
Cabinet, electing the Executive, authorising major policy discourse 
of the Executive or approve the Executive choices of individual 
members of Cabinet and other key appointments. Similarly, the 
legislative oversight, “involves the right of the Legislature to 
scrutinise Executive performance. In many political systems, there 
are regular procedures by which the legislative body can question 
and even investigate whether the Executive has acted properly in 
its implementation of public policies”(Danzinger 1998:134).
Parliament has the last word on both the defence and security 
policies of the state. It is parliament, which has the power to 
review these policies as it wishes and hold the Executive 
accountable for their implementation and for the development and 
deployment of the military both within and outside the state’s
borders. Similarly, and consistent, with the above perception, 
parliament performs the unique constitutional function of 
providing authorisation o f security and defence expenditure. It 
scrutinises the operations o f the military and also declares “states 
o f emergency and [the] state o f war. The state is the only 
organisation in society with [a] legitimate monopoly of force. This 
is delegated to the military and the military must therefore be 
accountable to the democratic legitimate authority”(Slaa 2004:26). 
As an instrument of foreign policy, the military should conduct its 
activities within the confines of the nation state, hence the reason 
that the parliament must sanction its activities.
The end of the Cold War has brought into currency the 
conscious aspect of the protection of human rights. The issue of 
human rights has become an essential requirement for 
democratisation and good government. This conditionality has 
equally elevated the role o f parliament more than ever to ensure 
their protection. Inevitably, this has made parliamentary oversight 
over the security apparatus of the state even more important to 
ensure that the military desist from acts, which violate human 
rights. The fact of the matter is that, there must be sufficient 
controls over the military, otherwise the institution will degenerate. 
It is important that parliaments ensure the existence of these 
controls, which will be strong enough to legitimise the operations 
of the military and prevent the degeneration of the service.
It is necessary for parliament to oversee the operations of the 
military and the Executive. This stems from the fact that 
parliament has a constitutional duty to enact legislation that 
governs the defence and security services o f the state. It is within 
these laws that mechanisms for budgetary control of the military, 
accountability and transparency are built. Parliaments in their 
oversight function also have a legislative role regarding activities 
o f the state security sector and other sectors. The legislative review 
of the Executive abuse or misuse o f power in areas such as the 
deployment o f the military without legislative sanction, is 
important in two ways. As Bentham wrote:
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“...firstly, legislators can halt Executive abuses and 
or poor decisions, the country is likely to be better 
off, since resources, both human and material, 
consequently will not be squandered on 
inappropriate missions. Secondly, even when the 
legislature is not sufficiently powerful to reverse 
decisions o f  the Commander-in-chief, legislative 
review can be beneficial. By publicizing instances o f  
Executive abuses and/or poor judgment, the 
legislature effectively limits the power o f  the 
Executive”(Bentham 2000, The Constitution o f  the 
Republic o f  South Africa 1996).
Ensuring that the military does not overstep its mandates and 
violate civil rights has become a public as well as a parliamentary 
issue. The concept of oversight presupposes the existence of a 
democratic government with a democratic constitution. It also 
entails the concept o f separation of powers between the Executive, 
judiciary and legislature. This would mean that all institutions of 
the state must be policed, most importantly by parliament, which is 
composed of democratically elected members of society serving as 
gatekeepers for national interests.
The activities of the military must be monitored and 
parliament, as the supreme body, must stamp its authority onto 
defence policy. Structural relationships between the government 
and armed forces are important in any country in building a 
political culture that determines the parliamentary control over the 
military. In order to perform this task, parliament must ensure the 
existence of structural relations between government and the 
military. Baregu writes:
“...it is imperative to note that the extent and 
effectiveness o f  Parliamentary oversight over 
defence and security matters in any country 
will depend mainly on the structural 
relationship that exists between the armed or 
defence forces and the government. All
governments have such relations with their
militaries "(Mwesiga 2004.37).
These structural relationships are formal in the sense that they have 
been spelled out in national constitutions, and are informal in the 
sense that they are embedded in the political culture o f the country 
concerned.
Executive Accountability
Schedler argues that political accountability primarily denotes 
“two basic connotations: answerability, the obligation o f public 
officials to inform about and to explain what they are doing; and 
enforcement, the capacity of accounting agencies to impose 
sanctions on power holders who have violated their public 
duties“(Andreasl999: 14). He argues further that this definition 
embraces monitoring, checks, control, oversight, restraint, public 
exposure and punishment that may be imposed on the public 
official for violation o f these rules. In essence, to account means to 
justify your actions or policies (Read 1993: 70). In fact, “the word 
‘executive’ comes from the latin ex sequi, meaning ‘to follow out’ 
or ‘to carry out’”(Danzingerl998: 140). The Executive is expected 
to explain before parliament how it arrives at certain budgetary 
figures. It has to account for how it intends to implement its 
financial policy or for how it has overspent the budget allocated by 
parliament (W ilsonl993). Parliament makes defence policy and 
approves the budget. This means that it can also concur with the 
Executive, alter, cancel or refuse to approve the budget. The 
budget is one o f the most effective implements o f civil control over 
the military (Ngoma2004), if  not the most insightful method that 
parliament can use to hold the Executive to account.
Apart from its major role of supervising the state 
administration, the primary role of the Executive is “to carry out 
the state’s policies, laws or directives”(Danzinger 1998: 140). For 
that reason, the Executive manages the external relations of the 
state. In managing foreign affairs, the Executive also manages the
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military. Therefore, “given the state’s monopoly of the legitimate 
use of force, the military (including internal security forces) is an 
area over which the top political Executive usually has direct 
control”(Danzingerl998: 143). The Chief Executive is always 
regarded as the Commander-in-Chief of the entire military 
establishment. Therefore, he or she sets policies, supervises the 
military organisation and utilises military capabilities. This task 
carries the most severe consequences for the security establishment 
and the well-being of the state at large. It is the legitimate duty of 
the legislature to scrutinise the Executive and hold it accountable. 
It is therefore important to examine the extent to which the 
parliaments of the intervening states held their Executives 
accountable for these interventions.
The Role of the Parliaments of Intervening Countries
In any democracy the Executive is held accountable by the body 
politic/legislature. It is the legislature that scrutinises the 
Executive’s actions/ and decisions regarding military interventions. 
The principle of accountability stems from the citizens represented 
in the legislature. Without Executive accountability, citizens’ 
rights are in truth merely promises (De Tocquevillel988, 
Lockel980). Unlike other intervening countries, which had 
constitutions, at the time of their (Angola, Botswana, Namibia, 
South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe) intervention in the DRC, 
Burundi and Rwanda did not. The other countries’ constitutions 
embraced these rights that are safeguarded by the legislature 
through the principle o f Executive accountability.
The Ugandan Government
The government o f Uganda was made up of a guerrilla movement, 
which came into being in the early 1980s under the leadership of 
Yoweri Kagata Museveni’s (Reilly2000) National Resistance 
Movement (NRM), which deposed “the military government of 
General Tito Okello Lutwa on 26th January 1986”(Reilly2000: 38).
The movement system of government, as the NRM is usually 
referred to, forbade political parties from mobilising for office and 
performing other legitimate party activities during the period of 
their intervention. The movement system of government is a one- 
party system that serves as “a vehicle for the nation’s leader or a 
device for distributing patronage”(Hague et al, 1993:250, 
Nnolil986) This unorthodox system was adopted in an effort to 
remedy intense factional fighting which had bedevilled Uganda 
since independence, and its concomitant abuse o f power 
(Reilly2000). The proponents of the Ugandan movement system 
observe that it has ensured that the government remains 
accountable to the Ugandan polity rather than to narrow sectional 
interests o f various Ugandan ethnic groups (The Ugandan 
Monitor 1999). Uganda has a unicameral government with 
numerous methods of electing representative to the legislature (The 
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995).
The 1995 Constitution o f Uganda requires at least two-thirds of 
a parliamentary vote in order to declare war. The Ugandan 
decision to intervene in the DRC was made by “the President 
himself, after consultation with only a few close military advisers. 
Apparently, neither important civilian advisers nor the parliament 
were consulted before the decision was taken, as is required by the 
Ugandan Constitution”(Clark2001: 262-3). In fact, there is little 
evidence to suggest that even the Presidential Cabinet and other 
interest groups were involved. Museveni’s government did not 
follow its constitution’s requirements when Uganda intervened in 
the DRC in both 1996-7 and 1998. Museveni appeared to have 
violated both the letter and spirit o f the Ugandan Constitution. He 
was not given a mandate by the legislature to deploy troops outside 
Uganda. His decision to intervene in both Rwanda and the DRC 
seems to have been unconstitutional because “the deployment of 
Ugandan Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) outside Uganda without 
parliamentary approval was unconstitutional, and parliamentarians 
for the most part failed to adequately respond to public criticism of 
Ugandan role in the DRC”(Clark 2001:49).
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The Ugandan Parliament, in the same light, is empowered to make 
laws regulating the activities o f the UPDF, especially providing for 
“the deployment of troops outside Uganda”(Mugungal999). 
Therefore, the Executive decision to deploy troops in the DRC 
could be viewed as not only a violation of the UN Charter but also 
of the Ugandan Constitution. Since the deployment o f troops was 
neither approved of nor forbidden by the Ugandan Parliament, it 
seemed that the Commander-in-Chief acted unilaterally and 
unconstitutionally by deploying these troops in the DRC. President 
Museveni also appears not have appraised the Ugandan Parliament 
about the UPDF’s operations in the DRC or outside the Ugandan 
territory, as required by the Ugandan Constitution. His violation of 
the Ugandan Constitution was even more pronounced in August 
1998:
“...when the Forces Arme'es Congalaises 
(FAC) began their insurrection against 
Kabila’s rule, Museveni was similarly 
circumspect with Parliament about Ugandan 
involvement. After Ugandan spokesmen were 
first silent about any UPDF role in the DRC.
Second Deputy Prime Minister Eriya Kategaya 
announced in late August that the UPDF was 
indeed operating just over the border within the 
DRC, ostensibly to pre-empt Allied democratic 
Forces (ADF) attacks into western 
Uganda ”(Onyango-Obbo 2004).
Immediately after the above admission by the Deputy Prime 
Minister, it was also reported that the UPDF was operating deep 
inside the DRC in places like Kisangani. Ordering the deployment 
of Ugandan Forces outside Ugandan territory without appraising 
Parliament in this way was another clear violation o f the Ugandan 
Constitution by the President.
When Museveni eventually appeared before the 
Ugandan Parliament in mid-September 1998, 
he was unrepentant. When making his carefully
planned appearance Museveni did not seek 
approval fo r  his decision from  Parliament: 
instead, he “launched into a tirade which 
included calling MPs who demanded dialogue 
'collaborators’, and the Hutus who comprised 
much o f  the D RC ’s eastern forces 
‘barbarians’”(Onyango-Obbo 2004).
From this time on, Museveni avoided MPs in debating Ugandan 
involvement in the DRC intervention. Museveni’s apparent 
disrespect o f the Ugandan Constitution appears to be a carryover 
from his guerrilla background. He believed in unilateralism rather 
than bilateral or multilateral negotiations. Lark argues that, most 
important:
“one observes a casual attitude towards the 
rule o f  law, as in Museveni s despatch o f  the 
UPDF to Congo without an enabling law from  
the Parliament, as specified in the Constitution.
In Uganda today, it is actually the military 
High Command that takes real decisions 
related to security, and not the Cabinet o f  
President Museveni ’’(Clark 2001:274).
It would seem that Museveni bypassed the Ugandan Parliament 
because it was not going to help his cause: solving African 
conflicts by military means. This practice is a direct violation of 
Article 210 o f the 1995 Ugandan Constitution, which argues that 
“Parliament shall make laws regulating the Uganda People’s 
Defence Force, in particular for... (d) the deployment o f troops 
outside Uganda”( The Constitution o f the Republic of 
Ugandal995). Nevertheless, no such law existed at the time of the 
UPDF deployment in Rwanda in 1990. However, Article 210 was 
never put to operation during the Ugandan intervention in the 
DRC.
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Similarly, Ugandan “Parliamentarians have generally failed in their 
duty to check Executive abuses. The list o f MPs who regularly 
denounce Uganda’s involvement in the DRC was very short” 
(Reilly2000:pp.51-52). Most MPs seemed to display a lack of 
bravery in holding the Executive to account. The striking exception 
in this regard was a motion tabled by the MP from Samia Bogwe 
North, Aggrey Awori, in relation to UPDF deployment in the 
DRC. It called for, inter alia:
"...a judicial inquiry into ‘current UPDF 
operations in D RC\ including a look at the 
‘justification, legality and cost’ o f  UPDF 
involvement, as well as a requirement that the 
UPDF leave the DRC within 90 days. While 
Awori claimed to have 28 signatures in total, 
only six MPs allowed their names to go on the 
copy presented to the Speaker, Francis Ayume.
Upon receiving the motion, Ayume requested 
that Awori delay moving it; Awori alleged that 
Ayume needed the time in order to seek 
guidance from Museveni "(Reilly2000:52).
Despite Awori’s allegations, this was an apparent demonstration of 
the Ugandan Parliament’s inactiveness in holding the Executive to 
account. It can, therefore, be argued that the Ugandan Parliament 
proved very reluctant to conduct its parliamentary duty. For 
instance, the deficient legislative review appears to have been 
exacerbated by the dominance of the ruling party in Uganda. The 
Executive Parliamentary dominance on legislative affairs has made 
accountability extremely difficult. These events have weakened the 
principle of legislative oversight of the Executive and Executive 
accountability in Uganda. Museveni appears to have succeeded in 
illegally bypassing Parliament when deploying the UPDF in the 
DRC. In addition, the Ugandan Parliament proved inadequate in 
employing serious efforts of holding Museveni accountable for the 
UPDF deployment in DRC and Rwanda.
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The Namibian Government
In Namibia, the parliamentary oversight function is enshrined in 
the Namibian Constitution. Article 119(2) stipulates that “the 
President shall be the Commander-in-Chief o f the Defence Force 
and shall have all the powers and exercise all the functions 
necessary for that purpose”(The Constitution of the Republic of 
Namibia 2000: 60). In other words, the Namibian President can 
deploy the Namibia army as he or she determines. Article 32(f) 
argues further that the President has the power to “declare martial 
law or, if  it is necessary for the defence of the nation, declare that a 
state o f national defence exists: provided that this power shall be 
exercised subject to the terms of Article 26(7) hereof’ ’’(The 
Constitution of the Republic o f Namibia 2000: 60). The President 
can also declare war euphemistically, known as a ‘state of national 
defence’, if he thinks that such conditions pertain in Namibia. He 
or she has been given considerable latitude to decide when to 
declare a state o f national defence and is the sole decision maker in 
this regard. Nevertheless, in performing these important functions, 
the President must adhere strictly to Article 26(7) o f the Namibian 
Constitution, which states that:
“The President shall have the power to 
proclaim or terminate martial law. Martial law 
may be proclaimed only when a state o f  
national defence involving another country 
exists or when civil war prevails in Namibia: 
provided that any proclamation o f  martial law 
shall cease to be valid i f  it is not approved 
within a reasonable time by a resolution passed 
by a two-thirds majority o f  all the members o f  
the National Assem bly” (The Constitution o f  the 
Republic o f  Namibia 2000:18-19).
This constitutional directive was, nevertheless, not adhered to. The 
Namibian intervention in the DRC conflict could only be 
consistent with the declaration o f martial law only if the DRC was
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at war with it, which was not the case in this DRC intervention. 
This violation could be apportioned to what Tapscott (2005). 
claims to be a failure of substantive parliamentary democracy in 
Namibia. This violation of the Namibian Constitution appears to 
have been influenced by the friendship cultivated during the 
struggle days between the Laurent Kabila and Sam Nujoma. Close 
ties developed between them during the early 1970s when SWAPO 
had its military bases in Tanzania. Like Zimbabwe, Namibia has 
no common border with the DRC and there was thus no immediate 
security threat to Namibian security. It was rather on the basis of 
the friendship between Nujoma and Kabila that the Namibian 
leader ordered the deployment of his troops in the DRC, in order to 
assist his friend. This deployment was done without consultation 
with the Namibian Parliament.
Despite noises made by the opposition parties in Namibia, the 
above constitutional resolution was never passed in parliament. 
Nonetheless, the Namibian Constitution remains vague regarding 
the proclamation of a state of national defence. The fact of the 
matter was that the Namibia intervention in the DRC did not 
necessitate the above declaration since the DRC was not at war 
with Namibia.
In defending his actions, President Nujoma argued that, as 
Commander-in-Chief o f the Namibian forces, he took a conscious 
decision, being fully aware of its consequences, which had 
“inherent dangers and problems including the death of Namibian 
troops. It was an honourable act of enlightened self-interests. The 
very worst was in store for us”(Tapscott,2005). What was more 
perplexing for most people was that the Namibian people were not 
initially told about the intervention in the DRC. Most were 
shocked by the DRC intervention and were completely unaware of 
the circumstances that led to it. Namibia’s legislators and the 
people at large were angry about the lack of consultation prior to 
intervention (Foreign military intervention 2004).
The constitutional requirement for the President’s proclamation 
of a state of national defence was not carried out. The question of 
why the country was at war in the DRC was not answered by the
Executive but rather by the Zimbabwean government, which said 
that both Namibian and Zimbabwean forces were in the DRC to 
assist Kabila’s regime. Furthermore, on the “Focus on Africa: BBC 
World Programme”, President Kabila agreed that he was being 
assisted by Namibian troops. It was only after several denials that 
Nujoma “finally admitted on Heroes Day that Namibian troops 
were indeed fighting in the DRC on the side o f President 
Kabila”(Namibia2004).
The presidential announcement was not constitutional. For 
example, it was not accompanied by any parliamentary resolution. 
Similarly, it was not made in accordance with Article 26(7) of the 
Namibian Constitution. It was clear that the intervention by 
Namibian troops violated the constitution. The President did not 
declare a state o f national defence, since this state of affairs 
pertains only when the country is involved at war with another 
country (The Constitution o f the Republic of Namibia 2000). As 
such, he could not even declare martial law.
Namibian opposition parties were furious that their President 
and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces unilaterally 
deployed troops in the DRC without consulting either his Prime 
Minister or his Cabinet (Namibia 2004). What infuriated them was 
the utter silence from the President in relation to the Namibian 
involvement in the DRC. They argued further that the government 
could have at least convened a special session o f Parliament so that 
this matter was subjected to democratic debate “and scrutiny, 
instead o f what appears to have been a personal decision on the 
part o f President Nujoma”(Namibia 2004).
The Namibian President, instead o f addressing Parliament on this 
matter, decided to address his party’s Central Committee, thus, 
denying the legislature its legitimate right to hold him accountable 
for this constitutional breach. Furthermore, as in most one-party 
dominant democracies, Members o f Parliament from the ruling 
party seemed to have neglected their responsibility o f holding the 
Executive to account before parliament. They did not push for 
debates relating to this issue and elected to discuss other matters 
not associated with the intervention, while the Executive continued
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to violate the Namibian Constitution. The failure of the Namibian 
Parliament to use its tools for checking the Executive was more 
apparent when the House could not even pass a motion or 
resolution regarding the intervention in the DRC.
The Government of Angola
Unlike most undemocratic states, Angola has its own constitution 
and parliament. The Angolan Constitution, like most constitutions 
of the intervening countries, recognises the President in Article 
56(1) as the Commander-in-Chief of the country’s forces. It puts 
the President at the helm of power as its head of state, which in 
position he “ symbolizes national unity, represents the nation 
domestically and internationally, ensures compliance with the 
Constitutional Law, and shall be Commander-in-Chief o f the 
Angolan Armed Forces”(Constitutional Law of the Republic of 
Angola August 1992). The President is also empowered to declare 
war and a state of emergency among some of his or her elaborate 
powers. In explaining the presidential powers, Article 66 with its 
various sub-sections, argues that:
“The President o f  the Republic shall have the 
following powers; (p) To declare war and make 
peace, after hearing the Government and 
following authorization by the National 
Assembly; (r) To declare a state o f  siege or 
state o f  emergency, in accordance with the 
law. (Constitutional Law o f  the Republic o f  
Angola August 1992).
This means that constitutionally, the President may declare war 
after being authorised to do so by the National Assembly. In 
addition, he can declare a state of siege following the same 
procedures in Article 66(p) and (r). The President’s capacity to 
make a unilateral declaration of war is therefore severely curtailed 
by the Angolan Parliament in this regard. This position is further 
strengthened by Article 67(1), which stipulates that:
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"The President o f  the Republic, after 
consultation with the Prime Minister and the 
President o f  the National Assembly shall take 
appropriate measures whenever the institutions 
o f the Republic, the independence o f the nation, 
territorial integrity or the fulfilment of 
international commitments are seriously and 
immediately threatened and the regular activity 
o f Constitutional public office 
interrupted" (Constitutional Law o f the 
Republic o f  Angola August 1992).
The Angolan Constitution, therefore, forces the President to 
consult and not act unilaterally concerning military deployment 
outside the country. The Council of the Republic is mandated by 
Article 75(1), (c) to “ ...state its views on the declaration of war 
and making of peace”(Constitutional Law of the Republic of 
Angola August 1992). The President must thus also allow the 
Council to air its views before any declaration of war is made. 
Only after this process has been undertaken would a declaration of 
war be legitimate. The Angolan Parliament and the Council have 
the right to hold the Executive to account before any declaration of 
war or state of emergency is declared.
The government of Angola, nonetheless, intervened in both the 
Congo-Brazzaville and the DRC without soliciting the views of the 
above bodies. This was despite several calls from parliamentarians, 
mostly the leader of the opposition. After intense lobbying, the 
government of Angola was forced by parliamentarians to agree to 
participate in parliamentary debates relating to Angola’s military 
interventions in the two neighbouring Congos (the DRC and 
Congo-Brazzaville). During the debate the Angolan government’s 
Minister of the Interior, Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos 
"Nando", told the members o f parliament that:
“...military intervention by the Angolan Armed 
Forces (FAA) in those countries was prompted
ROSAS Vol. 5 No. 1 and 2 231
by state reasons and imperatives o f  national 
security. Nando explained that such an action 
occurred in response to continued destabilization 
o f Angola through direct and indirect 
aggressions carried out by the two 
countries ''(Angola Parliament pursues debates 
on troops in DRC 2004).
This military intervention was against the spirit o f the Angolan 
Constitution. In It was also apparent that the Executive did not 
inform Parliament when it took the drastic decision of intervening 
in both the DRC and Congo-Brazzaville. The Angolan 
Constitution was therefore violated by the Executive. The leader of 
the opposition Partido Renovador Social (PRS), Lindo Bernardo 
Tito, initially argued that “the military intervention of Angola in 
the Congos was illegitimate and unconstitutional”(Angola 
Parliament pursues debates on troops in DRC 2004). The debates, 
which were driven by the PRS, were a result of an overt Executive 
intention not to account before the Angolan Parliament about these 
interventions. The Angolan legislature made great strides in 
holding the Executive to account for its interventions, unlike other 
intervening countries. Nevertheless, the dominance of the ruling 
party in the Angolan Parliament allowed the Executive to escape 
thorough scrutiny despite having intervened in both Congos 
unconstitutionally.
The Government of Zimbabwe
The intervention of Zimbabwe in the DRC was also not sanctioned 
by the country’s legislature or its constitution. According to the 
Zimbabwean Constitution, Chapter IV section 27(1): “There shall 
be a President who shall be head of State and Head of Government 
and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces”(The Constitution 
of Zimbabwel996). This Constitution was published as a Schedule 
to the Zimbabwe Order 1979. In Chapter X, which deals with the 
defence forces in Section 96(2), the Zimbabwean Constitution
argues that the Commander-in-Chief shall make determinations for 
the defence of Zimbabwe. “The supreme command of the Defence 
Forces shall vest in the President as Commander-in-Chief and, in 
the exercise of his functions as such, the President shall have 
power to determine the operational use o f the Defence Forces” 
(The Constitution of Zimbabwe 1996).
The Zimbabwean Constitution has thus given the President 
leeway to use the military as he pleases. In exercising his powers, 
he still has to consult the Cabinet and parliament. Nothing prevents 
Parliament from being involved or demanding the tabling of 
motions regarding decisions to intervene in other countries. The 
Zimbabwean Constitution argues that the President shall have such 
powers as are conferred upon him by it. Furthermore, an Act of 
Parliament or other law or convention in the same spirit shall 
confer power on him/her, which shall be made subject to any 
provision made by Parliament. In addition to this power the 
President has such prerogative powers as were exercisable before 
the appointed day. Furthermore, section (4) without prejudice to 
the generality of subsection (3), stipulates that:
“The President shall have power, subject to the 
provisions o f  this Constitution -  (c) to proclaim 
and to terminate martial law; and (d) to 
declare war and to make peace; and (5) In the 
exercise o f  his functions the President shall act 
on the advice o f  the Cabinet, except in cases 
where he is required by this Constitution or any 
other law to act on the advice o f  any other 
person or authority...(6) Nothing in this section 
shall prevent Parliament from  conferring or 
imposing functions on persons or authorities 
other than the President” (The Constitution o f  
Zimbabwe1996).
This means that even though the President has been conceded 
considerable discretion in carrying out his functions, he is still 
accountable to parliament. The decision to send 2,000 more troops
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into the DRC in October 1998 was believed to have been taken 
outside both the Cabinet and parliament (Good2002: 19). 
According to Hartnack (Business Day, 30th October 1998): “This 
major decision was taken by President Mugabe alone, without 
consultation with either parliament or his cabinet. More than half 
the members of the 54-strong cabinet were believed soon after to 
have voiced their opposition to the war” (Good2002: 19). It was 
inconceivable how the war would be funded. For some years 
before 1998, Zimbabwean finances were alleged to have been run 
from State House. This practice have made it difficult for the 
parliament to hold the Executive to account for funds destined for 
the military incursion and also for the intervention itself, which 
was conducted in complete violation of the Zimbabwean 
Constitution.
Kenneth Good is of the opinion that the DRC operation was 
conducted with so much secrecy that dead and wounded soldiers 
were even flown back at night. Parliament was completely in the 
dark about the cost of war because o f this secrecy. The President’s 
decision to intervene in the DRC without prior consultation with 
parliament, the Cabinet or his party’s Central Committee, shocked 
most Zimbabweans. Horace Campbell submits that:
there was no debate in the Zimbabwean 
Parliament. Under section 98 o f the 
Constitution, ZNA forces were to be used only 
fo r  the defence o f Zimbabwe. There were no 
public discussions on the costs to the 
Zimbabwean society or whether Zimbabwe 
could sustain an army in a country as large as 
Western Europe” Campbell 2003:26).
This unparliamentary action by the President motivated civil 
society, including the churches, trade unions and human rights 
groups, to mobile against it. Morgan Tsvangirai, who chaired the 
task force of the Zimbabwean Congress o f Trade Unions, led these 
groups. According to local opinion polls, over 70% Zimbabweans 
were against the war. The Zimbabwean legislators were furious
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with the Executive for deploying troops in the DRC without 
consultation with parliament. The failure for the Executive to 
convene a special session of parliament to discuss the DRC 
intervention was seen as the greatest violation of the Zimbabwean 
Constitution. Parliamentarians were worried about the increasing 
costs o f the intervention, for which the government continued to 
use a budget that was not passed by Parliament.
The opposition voices demanding an Executive explanation to 
parliament were ignored. The ruling party, which dominated 
Parliament, was not in concurrence with the opposition to hold the 
Executive to account. Parliament’s apparent inability to hold 
Mugabe to account was pervasive. Only two Zanu-PF members to 
play this role; one member was a woman while the other was a 
retired army general, Solomon Mujuru (Machipisa2004).’ It can 
also be argued that the retired member of the governing party had 
nothing to lose by criticising the Executive. He feared no de­
selection at the next elections bccause he was already retired. As 
for the other Member o f Parliament, she was not taken seriously by 
a Zanu-PF politburo since she was a minority o f the minorities in 
this male-dominated party. Nonetheless, their criticism was 
supported by business people, the NGOs and Zimbabwean people 
in general.
Global Witness, a British-based NGO, in its quest to make the 
voices of ordinary Zimbabweans heard, argued that the 
Zimbabwean government should unilaterally withdraw from the 
SOCEBO logging deal because this action was inconsistent with 
peace efforts. This NGO went further to demand that the 
Zimbabwean Parliament should condemn the corporate ambitions 
of the ruling party because some of them militated against peace
’The retired arm y ch ief, G eneral, o p en ly  challenged  M ugabe about the w isd om  o f  sending 
Z im babw ean so ld iers to the D R C  during a recent politburo m eeting o f  the ruling party. Other 
party m em bers a lso  w ere unhappy about the m ove. "We are very bitter about the decision to 
send our sold iers to Congo," said M avis C hidzonga , a ruling party m em ber o f  parliament. "We 
can't go  to war to support a country that never lifted a finger w hen w e w ere fighting for our 
liberation." "In Z im babw e, p eop le are su ffering, d y in g  from  hunger, there are no roads, no 
clean  water, but w e  can afford to fund a w ar in C ongo. W e are very bitter about it," added 
C hidzonga. "W here is the m oney  com in g  from?," she asked.
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initiatives in the DRC and were detrimental to regional peace 
efforts (Branching out2004).
The Zanu-PF-dominated parliament could not hold the 
Executive to account for the intervention. Among the opposition 
parties in the Zimbabwean Parliament, the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) had only three seats while Reverent 
Ndabanigi Sithole of ZANU had only two seats, out o f total of 120 
elected members o f the legislature. The lone voices of the 
opposition were not heard by their counterparts on government 
benches. While opposition parties did not agree on several issues at 
the time of the intervention in the DRC, they were united on 
Mugabe's military intervention in the DRC (Gamal 1996).
Despite the glaring constitutional breaches by the Zimbabwean 
Executive and the lone oppositional voices of Zanu-PF members 
and members of the opposition, the Zimbabwean Parliament was 
unsuccessful in holding the Executive accountable for this 
intervention. The governing party disabled the ability of parliament 
to hold its Executive to account for its deeds. Therefore, important 
constitutional questions could not be asked. Once again, parliament 
could not uphold the principle o f Executive accountability though 
it had sufficient tools to do so.
The South African Government
In South Africa, the dawn of constitutionalism and democratisation 
in 1994 ushered in a period of high expectations for accountable 
governance, not only within the SADC but also throughout Africa 
as a whole. Conversely, instability in the SADC region and Africa 
militated against this goal. This was characterised by the South 
African intervention in Lesotho.
After the release o f Nelson Mandela* and the first democratic 
elections in April 1994, South Africa joined the list of democratic 
countries in the world. The country adopted a new constitution on 
the 8th May 1996, which provided for election of the nation’s Chief 
Executive, the President, to the National Assembly. The 
Constitution names the President as the Commander-in-Chief of
South African National defence Force (SANDF) and obliges him 
to be accountable to the South African Parliament for any action he 
takes in this capacity (The Constitution o f the Republic of South 
Africa 1996).
The South African Constitution gives the President more 
flexibility when it comes to the declaration of war, or what is 
known as the ‘state o f national defence’. According to the 
Constitution, only the State President can declare war or a state of 
national defence. He is the sole official who can deploy the 
SANDF for this purpose. Chapter 11 o f the Constitution, which 
deals with defence, is more idealistic in content. Section 200(2) 
evokes the UN Charter’s Article 2(4), which prohibits the threat or 
use o f force. It argues that the SANDF should protect the 
Constitution of South Africa and its territorial integrity in 
accordance with the principles o f international law. This means 
that the functions of the defence force are circumscribed by the 
principle o f just war theory as discussed in international law. These 
instruments therefore fall within the UN Charter, which regulates 
the unilateral use o f force. This shows that the South African 
intervention in Lesotho, like that of Uganda in Rwanda and those 
of the three SADC countries in the DRC, was inconsistent with the 
South African Constitution and therefore fell outside this 
international framework.
According to Section 201(2), the South African Constitution 
empowers the President to deploy the SANDF in co-operation with 
the police in fulfilment of defending the country or carrying out its 
international obligations. The Constitution nevertheless mandates 
the President in accordance with section 201(3) to inform 
parliament promptly, when carrying out the above functions, of:
a) The reasons for the employment o f the defence force;
b) Any place where the force is being employed;
c) The number o f people involved; and
d) The period for which the force is expected to be.
(4) If Parliament does not sit during the first seven days after the 
defence force is employed as envisaged in subsection (2), the 
President must provide the information required in subsection (3)
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to the appropriate oversight committee The Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996).
Therefore, the President may declare a state of national defence 
as long as parliament approves his declarations within seven days. 
Put differently, the Parliament needs only be informed of the 
deployment “promptly” or no later than seven days after the 
SANDF is committed. In relation to the military intervention in 
Lesotho, the South African Parliament held debates on this matter. 
However, there were serious limitations regarding the review of 
the legislative process of the decision to deploy the SANDF 
outside the Republic. “In particular the president’s office violated 
the spirit o f an accountable Executive branch when it made the 
decision to intervene, and parliamentarians failed to adequately 
react to their constituents concerns with operation 
Boleas”(Reilly2000:46). The whole process encountered major 
problems from the beginning to the end. South African 
Parliamentarians seem not to have been consulted prior to the 
intervention. While the omission may be proper due to the urgency 
of what South African decision makers perceived as the explosive 
situation which was unfolding in Lesotho, it was inconsistent with 
the principles of parliamentary review of the Executive.
Like the Ugandan Parliament, which was dominated by one 
party, the overwhelming majority o f South African 
parliamentarians come from the ruling African National Congress 
(ANC). It can be argued that these parliamentarians failed to 
publicly criticise the Executive action in the coalition, the 
prosecution of the operation itself or the manner in which it was 
managed. This trend stems from the fact that the South African 
government appears to be developing authoritarian tendencies, 
especially against outspoken ANC parliamentarians, who have on 
occasion been demoted, disciplined and chastised not only by 
parliament but by the party as well (Kuperusl999:pp. 643-668). 
The cases of Bantu Holomisa and Patrick Lekota have shown the 
government’s determination to centralise power within the upper 
echelons.
According to the South African Communist Party (SACP), what 
was more telling was that “Parliamentarians largely neglected their 
democratic obligation to subject the decision to mount operation 
Boleas to close scrutiny and public debate”(SA Soldiers Die in 
Lesotho 1998). Political allegiances within the dominant ruling 
party seemed to make most parliamentarians unwilling to seriously 
challenge the SANDF intervention in Lesotho. There were 
sufficient parliamentary mechanisms available to legislators for an 
effective review o f the Commander-in-Chiefs orders. 
Nevertheless, the majority o f legislators agreed with the Executive.
The Government of Botswana
The President o f Botswana is the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Botswana Defence Force (BDF), according to Chapter IV section 
31 of the Botswana Constitution. He is empowered by section 
48(2)(a) of the Constitution to determine the operational use of the 
armed forces. Nevertheless, the BDF is also accountable to 
parliament for what Naison Ngoma terms military and budgetary 
policy, which must be subjected to public scrutiny. These checks 
and balances are important in subjecting the operations o f the BDF 
to popular will. As far as its operations and the deployment of the 
BDF outside the country are concerned, the Commander-in-Chief 
need only inform parliament o f such operations after they have 
taken place.
Parliament has recently been challenged to perform its 
oversight role over the Executive. The ruling Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP) has dominated parliament since 
independence in October 1966. This means that the accountability 
and oversight of parliament is a tricky business. The one-party 
dominance of Parliament seems to have made the principles of 
checks and balances for different levels of government inefficient. 
The accountability of government institutions, especially the 
military, has becomes difficult, elusive and shrouded in secrecy. 
Equally challenging has been the BDI intervention in Lesotho’s 
intrastate conflict. Most regional analysts were concerned that the
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decision to intervene in Lesotho seemed to have excluded the 
Botswana polity, particularly Parliament. Mpho Molomo writes:
'the decision that the BDF should intervene in 
Lesotho in September 1998 was a civilian 
decision taken by the Executive without the 
involvement o f Parliament. After Botswana 
and South Africa intervened in Lesotho, there 
was a popular perception that the president 
and his cabinet ought to have consulted 
Parliament before it made the decision to 
intervene ”(Molomo2005).
While the Botswana Parliament was not informed prior to this 
intervention, it would appear that the President was not 
constitutionally mandated to do so. His role, as discussed above, 
was to inform parliament after the fact. Nevertheless, 
parliamentarians appeared to have been reluctant to hold the 
President to account for the intervention. This led to the Member 
of Parliament for the Palapye constituency, Mr Sebetelato, angrily 
writing to Botswana’s Vice-President Khama:
“...protesting against the cabinet decision to 
send Botswana Defense Force soldiers to 
Lesotho without the knowledge o f  the 
members o f  Parliament. He warned that when 
the Executive became so powerful that it even 
took the legislature fo r  granted, then there 
was cause fo r  concern fo r  the future o f  direct 
and participatory democracy. That power, he 
lamented, ran against the nation's efforts to 
build a consultative, transparent and 
accountable society ’(Molomo2005,
Mmegil99&).
The actions of this sole individual effort serve to demonstrate what 
Thandi Modise describes as the serious limitations that one-party 
dominance in parliament creates in terms of parliament’s capacity
to play an effective oversight role and hold the Executive to 
account for its policies. Only one Member o f Parliament attempted 
to hold the Executive accountable, while the rest appear to have 
been less willing to play such a role. This supports Molomo’s 
argument that, in a situation where the Executive holds too much 
power, as it does in Botswana, it overwhelms the legislature and 
impacts negatively on its effectiveness. In Botswana, checks and 
balances are “non-existent as Parliament is totally controlled by the 
BD P”(M olom o2005), which not only made it difficult for the 
Legislature to operate effectively, but seemingly disenabled the 
principle of checks and balances as far as the Lesotho intervention 
was concerned.
Conclusion
This paper concludes that all states that intervened in Rwanda, the 
DRC and Lesotho (namely, Angola, Botswana, Namibia, South 
Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe) appear to have acted contrary to 
their constitutions. Their actions contradict Holmes’ and 
Beetham’s submission that national constitutions serve as a high 
law that bind governments to follow established rules and Hague’s 
assertion that states have to respect their constitutions.
Second, this paper concludes that the legislative oversight of 
intervening states was also weak because of what James 
Danzinger, Melvyn Read and Thandi Modise called the influential 
role o f one-party dominance in parliament, creating a situation 
wherein the majority o f parliamentarians overtly back the 
Executive and follow the party line. For instance, the strong 
political allegiance to the ANC by MPs in South Africa made them 
reluctant to challenge the Executive decision to intervene in 
Lesotho. These were the cases in Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe 
and Angola as well. In most cases, the leadership of Namibia, 
Angola and Zimbabwe displayed a recalcitrant attitude towards 
informing their people about their real intentions or the reasons 
behind their armies’ involvement in the DRC.
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The paper concludes that the supremacy of parliament over the 
Executive, emphasised by Hague, Anthony Birch(1993) and 
Melvyn Read, seems not to have worked before or during these 
interventions. The consequence of is parliaments that could not 
hold their Executives accountable for the unilateral deployment of 
troops outside their national boundaries. This practice appears to 
have weakened the oversight role of these legislatures. The role of 
the legislature, as conceived by Bentham, seems to have also been 
ignored by all parliamentarians in the intervening states, who were 
reluctant to hold their Executives accountable even when they had 
sufficient tools to do so.
The important principle of accountability, answerability and 
obligation of public officials to explain their actions, which 
Schedler highlights, was violated by intervening states. Therefore, 
in all these countries, especially those which had functioning 
legislatures, not much effort was made to hold the Executive 
accountable for the extra-territorial deployment of troops. Their 
legislatures did not adequately and sufficiently review the 
Executive’s decisions before interventions were conducted. It is 
clear that the parliamentary function of oversight is at its weakest 
in those countries where the Executive is strong and the parliament 
is weak. In all these countries, the interventions undermined the 
mechanism of Executive accountability because the leadership of 
these countries did not inform or account to their legislatures 
before intervening in other sovereign states.
The weakness of these institutions has made it easier for 
intervening countries to carry out their realists’ interests in other 
countries without being held to account by their legislatures. What 
this paper has shown is that when state interests are at stake, the 
Executive does not follow parliamentary processes. The existence 
of a parliament dominated by one party enables the Executive to 
execute their realist interests more easily than in one with 
relatively equal Members of Parliament. This means that in a 
parliament that is not dominated by one party, the level of 
oversight is higher and the Executive is more accountable. In such 
a parliament, the Executive influence is minimal.
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